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Spronz: Amoco Oil Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
AMOCO OIL CO. v. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY
LIABmiTY-Clean Air Amendments of 1970- Contamination of unleaded gasoline-Branded oil refiners may not be
held vicariously liable for the negligent contamination of unleaded gasoline by their lessee-retailers. 543 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir.
1976).
In a review of administrative regulations promulgated by the
Environmental Protection Agency,' the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit held, in a 2-1 decision, that the EPA
could not impose vicarious liability on branded oil refiners2 when
contaminated unleaded gasoline was offered for sale by their
lessee-retailers.3 In so holding, the court effectively emasculated
a regulation designed to implement the policies of section 211(c)
of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970.1 The majority based its
decision on the belief that the regulations went "well beyond the
bounds of traditional vicarious liability. ' ' 5 Thus, the decision
raises the question of the appropriateness of using common law
tests of vicarious liability in statutory situations which bear little
resemblance to problems existing at common law, and where to
do so tends to defeat the purposes of important social legislation.
The Background of the Case
VICARIOUS

When Congress enacted the Clean Air Amendments of 1970,6
it plainly intended to combat more aggressively the problem of
air pollution, notwithstanding the high cost to industry:
A review of achievements to date . . . make[s] abundantly
clear that the strategies which we have pursued in the war
1. 40 C.F.R. § 80.23(b)(2) (1976).

2. The term "branded refiner" refers to those refiners who distribute their brand
name gasoline through retail outlets bearing their corporate or brand name.
3. Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 543 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6c(c) (1970). See text accompanying notes 6-10 infra.
5. Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 543 F.2d 270, 275 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1858a (1970) (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-18571 (Supp. V
1964)). For a good overview of federal air pollution legislation which began in 1955 with
the Air Pollution Control-Research and Technical Assistance Act of 1955, ch. 360, 69
Stat. 322 (amended 1964), see Comment, The Clean Air Amendments of 1970: Better
Automotive Ideas from Congress, 12 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REv. 571 (1971).
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against air pollution have been inadequate in several important
respects, and the methods employed in implementing those
strategies often have been slow and less effective than they
7
might have been.
Section 211(c) gave to the Environmental Protection Administrator the authority, for the first time, to regulate or prohibit the sale
"of any fuel or fuel additive for use in a motor vehicle or motor
vehicle engine ' 8 which would interfere with the operation of emission control devices developed to reduce air pollution caused by
the automobile. The Act imposed a civil penalty of $10,000 per
day for violations of any regulations issued pursuant to the statute? This extensive authority was granted because of Congressional recognition that
[a]utomotive pollution constitutes in excess of 60 percent of
our national air pollution problem and such pollution is particularly dangerous in the highly urbanized areas of our country.
Therefore, increased attention must be paid to that source of
pollution by insisting on the kinds of motor vehicles and fuels
which will reduce pollution to minimal levels. 10
Pursuant to this authority, the EPA issued regulations in
1973" relating to the sale of unleaded gasoline suitable for use in
vehicles equipped with emission control devices, as the functioning of these devices is impaired by the use of leaded gasoline.'
Since leaded and unleaded gasoline are shipped in the same distribution system, however, the Agency was confronted at the outset with the problem of assuring that uncontaminated unleaded
gasoline reached the pumps." In order to effectuate the statutory
purpose by insuring that the proper standards were met, the liability section of the regulations imposed strict liability on the oil
7. H.R. REP. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 5356. It has been noted that the 1970 Amendments represent a legislative
policy which for the first time "forces technology to catch up with the newly promulgated
standards." Comment, 12 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. Rav., supra note 6, at 581.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6c(c) (1970). Prior to the 1970 Amendments, the law pertaining
to the regulation of fuels required only registration with the EPA of designated fuels for
the purpose of identifying their chemistry and their effects on the environment. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1857f-6c(a)(b) (Supp. V 1964). These provisions were retained in the 1970 Amendments.
42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6c(a)(b) (1970).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6c(d) (1970).
10. H.R. REP. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprintedin [1970] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD.NEws 5356, 5361.
11. 40 C.F.R. Part 80 (1973).
12. Statement by the EPA, 38 Fed. Reg. 1254 (1973).
13. Statement by the EPA, 39 Fed. Reg. 13174 (1974).
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refiners whenever contaminated unleaded gasoline was offered for
sale at branded retail outlets, regardless of where in the distribution system the violation actually occurred." The EPA justified
imposing such liability on the ground that "the contamination of
unleaded gasoline associated with transportation of the product
can best be prevented by the major refiners who have control or
the ability to control their distribution networks."15
The first challenge to the liability provisions came in 1974
when sixteen branded oil refiners submitted a petition for review
to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit." In
an opinion by Judge Wright, the court struck down the liability
provisions, noting that while the refiners "conceded that a presumption of liability would be reasonable,"' 7 they "must have the
opportunity to demonstrate freedom from fault"' 8 in certain
areas. The court observed that the refiners did not dispute the
EPA's determination that they had the "ability to control" their
distribution networks through lease and contract arrangements,
which included provisions for extensive quality control procedures and the imposition of penalties when contamination occurred." The refiners argued, however, that they should not be
held liable for contamination caused by "an unpreventable
breach of contract""0 by distributors, jobbers or others in the distribution network whose facilities were neither leased nor owned
by the refiner. 2' The court indicated its acceptance of this argument, holding that "[a] refiner which can show that its employees, agents, or lessees did not cause the contamination at issue,
and that the contamination could not have been prevented by a
reasonable program of contractual oversight, may not be held

liable

.... ,,"2

This decision, which permitted imposing vicarious liability
on the refiners for contamination caused by their lessees,2 3 clearly
14. 40 C.F.R. § 80.23(a)(1) (1973). The term "branded retail outlets" refers to those
service stations which purchase gasoline exclusively from a branded refiner and sell it
under the refiner's brand name.
15. Statement by the EPA, 38 Fed. Reg. 1254, 1255 (1973).
16. Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
17. Id. at 748.
18. Id. at 749.
19. Id. at 748.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 749 (emphasis added).
23. Id. The EPA so interpreted the decision: "It is clear from the Amoco decision that
branded refiners may be deemed in violation for the negligent acts of their lessees."
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indicated that the court assumed a difference in the degree of
control which the branded refiners could or should exercise over
their lessee-retailers as compared with that which they could exercise over others in the distribution network whose facilities were
not refiner-owned or leased. Furthermore, it seemed to have
agreed with the EPA that refiner liability for the former
"[extends] beyond contractual oversight." 4 In light of this decision, the EPA revised the liability section and promulgated new
regulations relating to refiner liability for contamination of unleaded gasoline occurring at the retail level.2 5 While the new regulations permitted the refiners numerous affirmative defenses,"
they imposed liability when contaminated unleaded gasoline was
offered for sale by directly-supplied retail dealers. 7 This liability
could be avoided only if the "assets or facilities [of such dealers]
are not substantially owned, leased, or controlled by the refiner." In short, under the new regulations the branded refiners
would always be vicariously liable for the negligent contamination of unleaded gasoline by their lessee-retailers."
The majority in Amoco Oil, refusing to permit this result,"°
overlooked what was really at issue-the fact that the statutory
purpose, i.e., the reduction of automotive pollution through the
prohibition of the sale of offending fuels, could be achieved only
by assuring the purity of unleaded gasoline at the retail level. The
EPA argued that this result could be attained only through extensive quality control and monitoring programs, and that the imposition of liability on branded refiners for violations occurring at
their branded retail outlets would encourage all refiners to adopt
Statement by the EPA, 39 Fed. Reg. 42356, 42358 (1974). Judge Wright, the author of the
first Amoco opinion, believed that this was unquestionably the holding. Amoco Oil Co. v.
EPA, 543 F.2d 270, 279 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Wright, J., dissenting). See note 30 infra.
24. Statement by the EPA, 39 Fed. Reg. 42356, 42358 (1974).
25. 40 C.F.R. § 80.23 (1976).
26. Liability could be avoided if the violation was caused by a distributor, id. §
80.23(b)(2)(v), (vi); by an indirectlysupplied retaileror by a reseller, id. § 80.23 (b)(2)(iii);
by a directly supplied independent retailer, id. § 80.23(b)(2)(iv); or if the contamination
was caused by sabotage or by intentional introduction of leaded gasoline into an automobile requiring unleaded gasoline, id. § 80.23(b)(2)(ii), (e)(i).
27. 40 C.F.R. § 80.23(a)(1), (b)(2)(iv) (1976).
28. 40 C.F.R. § 80.23(b)(2)(iv) (1976).
29. Id. Only a very small percentage of retail outlets are owner-operated (independent). Statement by the EPA, 39 Fed. Reg. 13174, 13175 (1974).
30. Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 543 F.2d 270, 279 (D.C. Cir. 1976). This Note does not
consider the issue of collateral estoppel which was argued by the EPA. Id.. Brief for
Respondent at 17-20. The issue was also presented by Judge Wright in dissent as a basis
for disposing of the case. Id. at 279-80 (Wright, J., dissenting).
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such necessarily costly programs. 3 ' The EPA's determination that
the "refiner's responsibility extends beyond contractual oversight
when the refiner owns or leases the branded station" 2 was
grounded in the notion of "control" as it relates to the realities
of the gasoline distribution system. While the nature of this marketing enterprise necessarily requires that the lessee-retailers exercise a relatively high degree of independence as to their customary activities, the refiners' ability to prevent the contamination
of unleaded gasoline arises from the structure of the distribution
system itself. In this system the branded product is transported
from the refinery to retail outlets owned or leased by the refiner,
placed in refiner-owned equipment and sold under the branded
trademark.3 3 The use of quality control techniques throughout the
entire distribution system would insure a technical competence
in handling both the product and the refiner-owned and supplied
equipment, thus reducing the number of contamination incidents
at the service station level. The EPA emphasized that at that
level
basic decisions respecting the conditions of sale of unleaded
gasoline are being made by the owner or lessor of the station and
not by the operator. . .. [The branded refiners are making
the decisions whether to adopt a three-grade marketing system,
installing a third pump and underground tank or whether to
retain a two-grade marketing system . . . Where a branded
station, the refiner makes the
refiner owns or leases a service
34
investment in new equipment.
Since the lessee-retailer is bound by contract to sell only the
brand of his lessor-refiner, he is extremely dependent upon his
refiner's quality control procedures both as to product and equipment. " Thus, regarding the specific problem of contamination,
there exists an arguably sufficient degree of refiner control over
31. Statement by the EPA, 39 Fed. Reg. 13174, 13176-77 (1974). Such a program,
which involves periodic testing at all points in the distribution system, had already been
initiated by Amoco. Id. at 13176.
32. Statement by the EPA, 39 Fed. Reg. 42356, 42358 (1974). It should be noted that
the EPA was bound by the 1974 decision to exclude the class of independent retailers
(owner-operators) from the vicarious liability provisions. See Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501
F.2d 722, 748-49 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Exclusion of this class, however, would not seriously
have affected the new regulations since owner-operated stations comprise a very small
percentage of the total branded outlets. See note 29 supra.
33. Statement by the EPA, 39 Fed. Reg. 13174, 13175-76 (1974). For a description of
the gasoline distribution system, see id. at 13175.
34. Statement by the EPA, 39 Fed. Reg. 13174, 13177 (1974).
35. Id. at 13176.
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lessee-retailers to justify imposing vicarious liability on the refiners for the contamination of unleaded gasoline caused by those
retailers.
The Majority Opinion-The Application of the Traditional
Common Law Test of Vicarious Liability
In striking down the liability provision as "arbitrary, '"" the
majority applied the common law "control" test to determine
whether the relationship between the refiners and their lesseeretailers justified the imposition of vicarious liability. The familiar doctrine of vicarious liability, or respondeat superior, permits
the imputation of another's negligence to one who has not himself
been negligent." The relationship most often associated with the
doctrine is that of master and servant (or, in more modern terminology, employer-employee), and the test of this relationship is
whether the nonnegligent party has control over, or the right to
control, the acts of the negligent party. 8 This control, whether or
not it is exercised, must be related to the manner and means of
performing the details of the work involved in the relationship."
If, however, the control, or the right thereto, relates only to the
results ordered and not to the manner of performance, the relationship is deemed to be one of employer-independent contractor,
and liability may not be imputed to the employer."
.36. The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970), authorizes the
reviewing court to "set aside agency action. . . found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." See note 44 infra.
37. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 26.2 (1956); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 69 (4th ed. 1971). For a history of the doctrine, see T. BATv,
VICARIOUS LIABILITY

(1916).

38. 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(l) (1958); F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra
note 37, at § 26.3; W. PROSSER, supra note 37, at § 70; Stevens, The Test of the Employment Relation, 38 MICH. L. REV. 188 (1939). The right to control has also been used as
one of many justifications for the doctrine of vicarious liability. F. HARPER & F. JAMES,
supra at 1366; W. PROSSER, supra at 459. However, since the issue in the present case does
not involve the validity of the doctrine, but concerns only the test of the relationship which
may give rise to the imposition of liability, the right to control will be considered throughout in this latter aspect.
The doctrine of vicarious liability has been treated thoroughly in the literature. See,
e.g., T. BATY, VICARIOUS LIABILITY (1916); Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration
of Risk, 38 YALE L.J. 584 (1929); Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47
U. CoLo. L. REV. 153 (1976); Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105
(1916).

39. See 1 RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF AGENCY

§ 220(1) (1958). It has been noted that

in industry today actual control is largely fictitious. Steffen, Independent Contractorand
the Good Life, 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 507 (1935).
40. 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409, Comment b (1965); F. HARPER & F.
JAMES, supra note 37, at § 26.11; W. PROSSER, supra note 37, at § 71; Harper, The Basis
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On the basis of these general common law rules, the Amoco
Oil majority found that the relationship between the branded
refiners and their lessee-retailers did not, in and of itself, present
sufficient evidence of control by the refiners to impose vicarious
liability on them,4" and that in this respect the regulations "alter
the settled law between lessor and lessee as to their respective
responsibilities in tort so as to make the refiner liable for
independent lessees as though they were mere subservient employees. 41 2 Finding no authority in section 211(c) of the Clean Air

Act of 19701 for such an exercise of discretion," the majority
insisted upon a case-by-case examination of the indicia of control
whenever the refiner would be able to raise the defense of lesseeretailer negligence for the contamination of unleaded gasoline,"
and required that there be shown "a demonstrated link between
a lease agreement and a degree of actual control"46 before vicarious liability could be imposed on the refiner. While the court
reserved the question of the extent of control which would be
sufficient to impose vicarious liability on the refiners, it is clear
that the court applied the traditional common law "control" test
of the employment relationship.47
Frequently, third-party damage suits are brought against
branded refiners for personal injuries sustained through the negliof the Immunity of An Employer of An Independent Contractor,10 IND. L.J. 494 (1935);
Morris, The Torts of An Independent Contractor,29 ILL. L. REv. 339 (1934); Steffen, supra
note 39, at 501. A list of factors distinguishing the' employee from the independent contractor is found in 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958).
41. Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 543 F.2d 270, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
42. Id. at 275.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6c(c) (1970).
44. The court did not find that the EPA had acted beyond the scope of its authority.
Indeed, the EPA had the authority under § 211(c) of the Clean Air Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1857f-6c(c) (1970), to regulate or prohibit the sale of offending fuels. The court believed,
however, that the liability provisions were an arbitrary means to accomplish this end. See
text accompanying note 36 supra. The majority clearly indicated its position by adopting
as its standard of review subparagraph (A) of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1970) (Administrative
found
Procedure Act), which directs the reviewing court to "set aside agency action ...
to be. . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law." The court stated, "That standard justifies the disposition we make of this case."
Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 543 F.2d 270, 274-75 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1976). If the court had found
that the EPA exceeded its statutory authority, it would have adopted as its standard of
review subparagraph (C) of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1970), which directs the reviewing court to
"set aside agency action. . . found to be. . . in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority,
or limitations, or short of statutory right."
45. Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 543 F.2d 270, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 277 & n.20.
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gence of their lessee-retailers. The law relating to the respective
legal responsibilities in tort of refiner and retailer is, however,
"settled,"4 9 as the majority suggests, only in the sense that the
courts are agreed that in deciding these cases all of the facts will
be scrutinized in order to determine the relationship between the
parties." The generally accepted test for determining refiner liability is "whether the oil company has retained the right to control the details of the day-to-day operation of the service station;
control or influence over results alone being viewed as insufficient."'5' The courts are also in agreement that the terms of the
lease will not be dispositive if the evidence in fact indicates control by the oil company.5 2 The courts are not in agreement, however, as to the relative weight to be accorded the pertinent factors. And, while the majority of the decisions have found that the
lessee-retailer is an independent contractor, thus relieving the oil
company of liability, the courts have failed to adopt any general
principle other than the "control" test for deciding these cases. 3
At least one court has acknowledged:
The legal relationships arising from the distribution systems of major oil-producing companies are in certain respects
unique. . . . "This distribution system has grown up primarily
as the result of economic factors and with little relationship to
traditional legal concepts in the field of master and servant, so
that it is perhaps not surprising that attempts by the court to
discuss the relationship in the standard terms have led to some
difficulties and confusion."5
48. See cases cited at notes 51-53 infra.
49. Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 543 F.2d 270, 275 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
50. See cases cited at notes 51-53 infra.
51. Hoover v. Sun Oil Co., 212 A.2d 214, 216 (Del. Super. 1965).
52. Brenner v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 236 Mo. App. 524, 158 S.W.2d 171 (1942);
Texaco v. Layton, 395 P.2d 393 (Okla. 1964); Willman v. Texaco, Inc., 535 S.W.2d 774
(Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
53. Compare Brenner v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 236 Mo. App. 524, 158 S.W.2d 171
(1942) and Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Martin, 148 Tex. 175, 222 S.W.2d 995 (1949)
with Smith v. Cities Service Oil Co., 346 F.2d 349 (7th Cir. 1965); Hoover v. Sun Oil Co.,
212 A.2d 214 (Del. Super. 1965); Cawthon v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 124 So.2d 517 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Manis v. Gulf Oil Corp., 124 Ga. App. 638, 185 S.E. 2d 589 (1971);
Elbers v. Standard Oil Co., 331 Ill. App. 207, 72 N.E.2d 874 (1947); Chevron Oil Co. v.
Sutton, 85 N.M. 679, 515 P.2d 1283 (1973); Coe v. Esau, 377 P.2d 815 (Okla. 1963); Texas
Co. v. Wheat, 140 Tex. 468, 168 S.W.2d 632 (1943); Foster v. Steed, 19 Utah 2d 435, 432
P.2d 60 (1967). One commentator has noted that "ihe myriad factual combinations
possible with varying degrees of economic control complicate the problem of forecasting
the result in any particular situation." Comment, Master and Servant-The Filling Station Operator as an Independent Contractor, 38 MIcH. L. REv. 1063, 1072 (1940).
54. Hoover v. Sun Oil Co., 212 A.2d 214, 215 (Del. Super. 1965) (quoting Annot., 83
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This confusion in the cases has been criticized not only for

the resultant lack of predictability, but also because the independent contractor doctrine is falling into disfavor as an anachronism

in the modern economic sphere. 5 Commentators note that this is
especially true with respect to the "unique" character of the gasoline distribution system. 6 Indeed, a recent decision by a Maryland court, which permitted evidence of a refiner-retailer agency
relationship to go to the jury in a personal injury case, purports

to find an emerging trend toward rejecting the independent contractor immunity in refiner-retailer tort cases in favor of using the

agency principle of apparent authority:
A.L.R.2d 1282, 1284 (1962)).
55. Harper, 10 IND. L.J., supra note 40, at 499-500; Morris, supra note 40. There are
14 exceptions to the general rule that an employer is not vicariously liable for the torts of
an independent contractor. 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 416-429 (1965). These
exceptions "have so far eroded the 'general rule,' that it can now be said to be 'general'
only in the sense that it is applied where no good reason is found for departing from it."
Id. § 409, Comment b. These exceptions fall into two general categories, the so-called
nondelegable duty doctrine and the doctrine of inherently dangerous work, and they have
been developed for policy reasons which deny to the employer the independent contractor
immunity in cases in which it is felt that the employer has a responsibility which he alone
has the duty to discharge properly. "There has been a rather marked tendency, especially
in recent years, to extend the scope of many of the rules [of vicarious liability for the torts
of independent contractors]. The law is still obviously undergoing a process of development toward limits which are still uncertain." Id., Introductory note at 395. Prosser
is difficult to suggest any criterion by which the non-delegable characobserves that "[ilt
ter of such duties may be determined, other than the conclusion of the courts that the
responsibility is so important to the community that the employer should not be permitted to transfer it to another." W. PROSSER, supra note 37, at 471.
While it would seem desirable to bring the gasoline contamination problem within
the scope of the nondelegable duty doctrine, this result is foreclosed by the 1974 decision
in Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722, 748-49 (D.C. Cir. 1974). There, the court refused
to impose liability on the refiners for contamination caused by several classes of contractors within the distribution system. See text accompanying notes 16-22 supra. In short,
the court did not respond to the EPA's argument that "there is a positive duty on the
major brand refiner to prevent any violation of the unleaded gasoline standard at his retail
outlets .. " Statement by the EPA, 38 Fed. Reg. 1254, 1255 (1973).
56. Comment, 38 MICH. L. REv., supra note 53; Note, Tort Liability of Oil Companies
for Acts of Service Station Operators, 3 VAND. L. REv. 597 (1950). See also note 57 infra.
The authors of a leading treatise note that:
Questions arise mainly where an enterprise makes regular use of individuals
(e.g., salesmen or newsboys) or units that would ordinarily be regarded as subordinate to it (such as the filling stations of the great oil companies), in order to
get something done which would ordinarily be regarded as a part of its enteris here that immunity for the conduct of independent contracprise. . . . [Ilt
tors tends most to thwart allocation of losses to responsible enterprises, and
therefore that the defense of independent contractor meets mounting disfavor.
F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 37, § 26.11, at 1402-03.
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We well recognize the significance of this result. We are
aware also that traditionally oil companies have been protected
from liability by reciprocal leases and simultaneous dealer
agreements which have provided a moat between the company
and its "independent" operator which could not be bridged by
actual agency, express or implied. The use of apparent agency
to ford that moat is at best an "emerging doctrine,". . . and is
not always accepted by courts when it has been offered."
Thus, the Amoco Oil majority not only imports into the regulatory scheme the somewhat discredited independent contractor
doctrine, but also creates an administrative nightmare by
requiring the case-by-case scrutiny of the refiner-lessee relationship which occurs in personal injury cases. This kind of examination, which can range from a determination of the refiner's control
over the cleanliness of the rest rooms to its control over the financial operations of the station, is unsuited to the needs of efficient
regulatory procedure. By importing this unsettled law into the
administrative scheme, the majority indicated an insensitivity to
the statutory purpose as well as to the possible scope of the vicarious liability rules.
The Dissent-The Statutory Purpose Must be Served
In his dissent, Judge Wright vigorously questioned the majority's reliance on the traditional common law test of vicarious
liability, noting that the test is not "cast in concrete,""8 and that
liability does not have to depend in every case "upon the familiar
dichotomy between employee and independent contractor.""
Judge Wright made a critical distinction-indeed, it is the crux
of the issue-when he observed:
[The common law test] may well be a serviceable distinction
when applied to exonerate the refiner of responsibility for most
negligent torts committed by a lessee-retailer or the lessee's
employees. But it simply does not apply here. EPA is not trying
to hold refiners liable for every personal injury caused by lessees
57. Mabe v. B.P. Oil Corp., 31 Md. App. 221, 356 A.2d 304, 312 (1976). See Gizzi v.
Texaco, Inc., 437 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1971); Sanders v. Clark Oil Refining Corp., 57 Mich.
App. 687, 226 N.W.2d 695 (1975); Johnston v. American Oil Co., 51 Mich. App. 646, 215
N.W.2d 719 (1974); Note, 3 VAND. L. REV., supra note 56, at 605-06. Contra, Miller v.
Sinclair Refining Co., 268 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1959); Apple v. Standard Oil, Div. of Am.
Oil Co., 307 F. Supp. 107 (N.D. Cal. 1969); Sherman v. Texas Co., 340 Mass. 606, 165
N.E.2d 916 (1960).
58. Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 543 F.2d 270, 281 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Wright, J., dissenting).
59. Id.
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or their employees. Its regulations are narrowly focused on one
specific evil, and in this limited area, because of the realities of
the gasoline distribution system . . .vicarious liability of
refiner-lessors is a sensible and permissible control strategy."
Judge Wright clarified his dissent, which rested on policy
grounds, by referring to the violation at issue as a "'new tort,' " 1
one which was a product of the clash between technology and the
public health and welfare.62 While admitting that the common
law vicarious liability rules were "relevant, ' 6 3 he refused to
consider them "dispositive," 6 4 and saw no reason why a more
realistic standard of vicarious liability should not be used to define the legal responsibilities of refiner and lessee-retailer for this
specific statutory purpose.65 Noting that the issue of liability in
the consumer products field has undergone pronounced changes
due to the willingness of the courts to respond to the changing
economic and technological environment, he urged that similar
considerations apply in the present case. 6 Freed from the restrictions of the rules of common law vicarious liability in tort, the
EPA would be permitted to fulfill the statutory purpose by establishing standards of liability appropriate to this particular offense:
Perhaps the key to the majority's misapprehension of the
real issues in this case lies in its failure to appreciate this distinction between applying given standards and establishing new
ones. It repeatedly acts as though Congress had directed EPA
to apply-lock, stock, and barrel-the traditional standards of
vicarious liability ...
One may scan the Clean Air Act in vain for any hint that
Congress meant EPA to take such a crabbed view of its role."7
Judge Wright believed that the control exercised by the
branded refiners over their distribution networks in relation to
the lessee-stations was sufficient to fall within the relevant vicari60. Id.
61. Id. Judge Wright noted that the tort label might not be appropriate because the
common law vicarious liability rules would apply if a consumer sued for damage to his
emission control device caused by contaminated unleaded gasoline. Id. n.8.
62. Id. at 281.
63. Id. n.7.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 282.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 284 n.12.
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ous liability rules for purposes of this regulatory measure.6 8 He
reasoned that it was not necessary to hold lessee-retailers "fully
independent for all purposes" 9 merely because they are often
found to be independent for purposes of allocating liability for
70
personal injuries.
The Independent Contractorand the Statutory Purpose
Doctrine-Retreatfrom the Common Law
With the advent of the social legislation of the 1930's, the
employment relationship became the focus of judicial concern in
an area other than vicarious liability. It became necessary to
provide a definitional standard whereby working people would or
would not be included within the protection of legislation such as
social security, workmen's compensation, fair labor standards
and labor relations. Although this legislation differs in substance
and scope from the regulatory scheme presently under consideration, the ways in which courts and commentators have dealt with
the barrier to statutory fulfillment presented by the common law
"control" test are apposite. The cases which will be considered
provide, by analogy, an insight into the potential scope of the
common law vicarious liability rules as they might be applied to
this specific public interest statute as implemented by the EPA
regulations.
In a recent case arising under the Fair Labor Standards Act,7 '
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that "[tihe terms
'independent contractor,' 'employee,' and 'employer' are not to
be construed in their common law senses when used in federal
social welfare legislation. 72 This doctrine first appeared in a series of Supreme Court cases decided in the 1940's in which the
Court announced the "economic reality" test as being a more
realistic criterion designed to effectuate the statutory purpose of
employee protection.73 The Court recognized the fact that while
the "control" test was relevant to a determination of the employ68. Id. at 282.
69. Id. at 284. The majority considered the lessee-retailers to be independent. See
text at note 42 supra.
70. Id. at 283-84.
71. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1970).
72. Mednick v. Albert Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 297, 299 (5th Cir. 1975).
73. Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947) (Social Security Act);'Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 726-27 (1947) (Fair Labor Standards Act);
United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 713 (1947) (Social Security Act); NLRB v. Hearst
Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 124-29 (1944) (National Labor Relations Act).
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ment relationship, it would, standing alone, seriously constrict
the interpretation of that relationship and thus defeat the legislative purposes sought to be achieved by excluding those who
should be covered. The new criterion was variously stated, but
the essence of it was framed by the Court in NLRB v. Hearst
Publications,Inc.:
Unless the common-law tests are to be imported and made
exclusively controlling, without regard to the statute's purposes,
it cannot be irrelevant that the particular workers in these cases
are subject, as a matter of economic fact, to the evils the statute
was designed to eradicate and that the remedies it affords are
appropriate for preventing them or curing their harmful effects
in the special situation.74
The Court observed that the common law "control" test for determining vicarious liability in tort "has been by no means exclusively controlling in the solution of other problems."'75 The effect
of the new doctrine was to include within the coverage of the
statutes people who, in traditional common law terms, were not
employees but who fell rather into some intermediate class having characteristics of both employees and independent contractors.7 This category included those usually referred to as border77
line cases.
74. 322 U.S. 111, 127 (1944). In subsequent cases the Court restated the proposition,
stressing that "in the application of social legislation employees are those who as a matter
of economic reality are dependent upon the business to which they render service....
It is the total situation that controls." Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947)
(emphasis added). See United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 719 (1947).
75. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 120-21 (1944).
76. One state court noted that under its Unemployment Compensation Law "[t]he
most independent of independent contractors therefore are not included in the class of
individuals entitled to benefits, but a class of individuals, who under [the] strict common
law concept of independent contractorship were other than employees, are entitled."
Globe Grain & Milling Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 98 Utah 36, 40, 91 P.2d 512, 514 (1939).
77. Compare Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126 (1947) (bandleaders) and United
States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947) (unloaders), with United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704
(1947) (driver-owner truckers). The Court consolidated Silk with Harrison v. Greyvan
Lines, Inc. The unloaders in Silk were found to be employees, while the truckers in both
Silk and Greyvan Lines were found to be independent contractors. Justices Black, Douglas
and Murphy dissented as to the truckers, on the grounds that the new doctrine required
a finding that these workers were also employees. United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. at 719.
Justice Rutledge would have remanded the cases as to the truckers for reconsideration by
the lower courts in light of the new doctrine, observing that "the District Courts and the
Circuit Courts of Appeals determined the cases largely if not indeed exclusively by applying the so-called 'common law control' test as the criterion. This was clearly wrong, in
view of the Court's present ruling." Id. at 721.
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Congress subsequently undermined the Court's decisions by
amending the legislation in the area of social security and labor
relations to require that the employment relationship be determined by reference to the common law rules, while leaving unchanged the legislation in the fair labor standards area." There
is to this day, however, considerable disagreement over the effect

of the legislative amendments and, for example, at least four
circuits choose to follow some variation of the reasoning of NLRB
v. HearstPublications,Inc., 7 United States v. Silk, 0 and Bartels
v. Birmingham,8' deciding close cases arising under the social
security laws with reference to the broader criteria announced

therein. 8 Even as to the "control" test itself, as one of the deter78. The pertinent sections now read:
29 U.S.C. § 203(e) (1970) (Fair Labor Standards Act):
"Employee" includes any individual employed by an employer ...
26 U.S.C. § 3121(d)(2) (1970) (Federal Insurance Contributions Act):
[Tihe term "employee" means . . . any individual who, under the

usual common law rules applicable in determining the employeremployee relationship, has the status of an employee ...
26 U.S.C. § 3306(i) (1970) (Federal Unemployment Tax Act):
[Tihe term "employee" has the meaning assigned to such term by
section 3121(d) ...
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970) (Labor Management Relations Act):
The term "employee" shall include any employee

. . .

but shall not

include. . . any individual having the status of an independent contractor....
Under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act, certain borderline classes of workers, who
would have been considered independent contractors at common law, are now specifically
included within the coverage of the Act. 26 U.S.C. § 3121(d)(3) (1970). These are agent
and commission drivers, salesmen, and home workers. This specific inclusion applies to
all but full-time life insurance salesmen and home workers under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act. 26 U.S.C. § 3306(i) (1970).
The amendments to the social security laws were a result of congressional concern
that the Supreme Court's guidelines would prove to be too vague and would lodge too
much discretion with the administrative agencies in determining coverage under the social
security laws. United States v. W.M. Webb, Inc., 397 U.S. 179, 187 (1970). This concern
is inapposite to the issue presented to the court in the present case. For a discussion of
the legislative amendments in the social security area, reaching the conclusion that they
did not restrict the scope of the Supreme Court's decisions, see Ringling Bros.-Barnum
& Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Higgins, 189 F.2d 865, 867-69 (2d Cir. 1951).
79. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
80. 331 U.S. 704 (1947).
81. 332 U.S. 126 (1947).
82. Coddens v. Weinberger, 505 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1974); Texas Carbonate Co. v.
Phinney, 307 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1962); Ben v. United States, 139 F. Supp. 883 (N.D.N.Y.
1956), aff'd per curiam, 241 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1957); Westover v. Stockholders Publishing
Co., 237 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1956); Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows,
Inc. v. Higgins, 189 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1951). Contra, Air Terminal Cab, Inc. v. United
States, 478 F.2d 575 (8th Cir. 1973) (retaining the "control" test).
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minatives of the employment relationship, there is an indication
of a continuing relaxation of the rigidity of the common law standard. The 1970 decision of the Supreme Court in United States
v. W.M. Webb, Inc., 3 has been interpreted as holding that the
standard for the control factor should be the "degree of control
that is commonly exercised in that business."" There is no question that the "economic reality" test is accepted by the courts in
determining the employment relationship under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.85
The majority in Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA"6 struck down the
vicarious liability provisions because it believed that the relationship between the branded refiners and their lessee-retailers did
not satisfy the common law "control" test. 7 It is clear, however,
that this threshold standard has been judicially eroded, and has
been found to be "by no means exclusively controlling"86 in dealing with problems other than vicarious liability in tort. The
courts have used two separate but related approaches: They have
redefined the test and have examined closely the purpose for
The circuit courts appear to take the view that the "economic reality" test is merely
a restatement of the proposition that the "total situation," and not just the right of
control, must determine the existence of the employment relationship. See, e.g., Avis Rent
A Car System, Inc. v. United States, 503 F.2d 423, 430 (2d Cir. 1974); Flemming v.
Huycke, 284 F.2d 546, 547 (9th Cir. 1960). A leading case in the Court of Claims, however,
distinguishes the two tests, substituting instead the doctrine that the employment relationship is to be determined by the common law rules realistically applied. Illinois TriSeal Prods., Inc. v. United States, 353 F.2d 216, 226, 228 (Ct. Cl. 1965). See also McCormick v. United States, 531 F.2d 554, 558 (Ct. Cl. 1976). This interpretation is followed by
at least two circuits: Coddens v. Weinberger, 505 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1974); Texas Carbonate Co. v. Phinney, 307 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1962). An examination of the factors considered
by all of these courts indicates, however, that whatever the label applied to the test, it is
some variant of the doctrine of Hearst, Silk and Bartels. The Texas Carbonate court
observed that "[a]lthough the determination [of the employment relationship] is to be
made by common law concepts, a realistic interpretation of the term "employee" is to be
adopted, and doubtful questions should be resolved in favor of employment in order to
accomplish the remedial purposes of the legislation involved." Texas Carbonate Co. v.
Phinney, 307 F.2d at 292 (emphasis added). This complex subject is covered in Broden,
General Rules Determining the Employment Relationship Under Social Security Laws:
After Twenty Years An Unsolved Problem, (pts. 1-2), 33 TEMPLE L.Q. 307, 381 (1960). For
a good review of the effect of the amendments in the labor relations field, see Jacobs, Are
"Independent Contractors" Really Independent?, 3 DEPAUL L. REv. 23 (1953).
83. 397 U.S. 179 (1970).
84. McCormick v. United States, 531 F.2d 554, 558 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
85. See, e.g., Mednick v. Albert Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1975);
Hodgson v. Taylor, 439 F.2d 288 (8th Cir. 1971); Shultz v. Mistletoe Express Serv., Inc.,
434 F.2d 1267 (10th Cir. 1970).
86. 543 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
87. Id. at 276.
88. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 120-21 (1944).
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which the test is to be used. The court in Amoco Oil could have
drawn on this body of precedent to reach a different result. The
complexities of the modem economic and technological world
demand at least this much.
The continued vitality of the doctrine of Hearst and Silk is
also demonstrated by a growing dissatisfaction with the common
law test of the employment relationship in the area of workmen's
compensation, an area which traditionally has used the "control"
test to determine coverage. 9 Once again there has been a recognized need to use more realistic criteria because "the test of the
employment status should be relevant to the purpose for which
status is being tested." 0 The "relative nature of the work" test,
which is essentially a variant of the "economic reality" test, has
been suggested as a viable alternative to the "control" standard
in the workmen's compensation field.91 At present, it appears that
only the New Jersey courts have openly adopted the concept,92
but at least one authority believes that the trend is clearly discernible. 3 Reasoning that any test must be relevant to the scope
of the legislation involved, and urging adoption of the suggested
standard, Judge Conford's dissenting opinion in Marcus v. Eastern AgriculturalAssociation, Inc., which was adopted by the Supreme Court of New Jersey on review, observed:
89. See, e.g., Bieluczyk v. Crown Petroleum Corp., 134 Conn. 461, 58 A.2d 380 (1948);
Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp. v. Vicars, 221 Ind. 387, 47 N.E.2d 972 (1943); Dawson v.
Clark Oil and Refining Corp., 410 S.W. 2d 353 (Mo. App. 1966). But see Bowser v. State
Indus. Accident Comm'n, 182 Ore. 42, 185 P.2d 891 (1947). While the court in Bowser used
the "control" test, it cited Silk for the proposition that social legislation is to be liberally
construed to effect the statutory purpose and observed: "That different results or conclusions have been arrived at from the same state of facts is only natural. It depends, to some
degree, upon the purpose sought to be accomplished by the act being administered."
Bowser v. State Indus. Accident Comm'n, id. at 45, 185 P.2d at 892. A leading authority
on workmen's compensation refers to the doctrine of Hearst and Silk as the "newer way"
of arriving at a determination of the employment relationship. 1A A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATMN LAW § 43.41 (1973).
90. 1A A. LARSON, supra note 89, at § 45.32(a).
91. Id. at §§ 43.50, 44.20.
92. Rossnagle v. Capra, 127 N.J. Super. 507, 318 A.2d 25 (1973), aff'd per curiam, 64
N.J. 549, 318 A.2d 20 (1974); Marcus v. Eastern Agricultural Ass'n, Inc., 58 N.J. Super.
584, 157 A.2d 3 (1959) (Conford, J., dissenting), rev'd, 32 N.J. 460, 161 A.2d 247 (1960).
The reversal in Marcus was on the grounds of Judge Conford's dissent in the lower court.
93. Larson has observed in general that "[tihere is therefore beginning to be evinced
in the decisions a sort of unexpressed conviction that, if the proper scope of workmen's
compensation and other remedial enactments is not to be defeated, a different criterion
based on the realistic nature of the work must be given more weight." 1 A A. LARSON, supra
note 89, at § 45.10. See also id. § 43.54.
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Patently, where the type of work requires little supervision over
details for its proper prosecution and the person performing it
is so experienced that instructions concerning details would be
superfluous, a degree of supervision no greater than that which
is held to be normally consistent with an independent contractor
status might be equally consistent with an employment relationship. In such a situation the factor of control becomes inconclusive, and reorientation toward a correct legal conclusion must
be sought by resort to more realistically significant criteria."
The cases in the field of social legislation clearly indicate
that the statutory purpose doctrine compels judicial flexibility.
Surely, it is improper to suggest that because certain categories
of people are included in the class of employees for purposes of
social welfare legislation, their employers would be, in all cases,
vicariously liable in tort for any and all of their negligent acts. No
such proposition need, nor indeed should, follow. This principle
applies with equal force to the legislation presently under consideration. To hold branded oil refiners vicariously liable, under this
specific regulatory scheme, for the contamination of unleaded
gasoline by their lessee-retailers would not alter the legal respon5
sibilities of refiner and retailer in the law of negligence generally.
In the leading case on chain store taxation, wherein it was held
that a refiner "controlled" its filling stations for purposes of the
chain store tax, the court observed:
[T]he determination by the courts that a particular sort of
control was meant by the lawmaking body in dealing with one
set of circumstances does not require that the same conclusion
be reached when a different legislative purpose is to be accomplished.
. . . We are not called upon to decide the question of tort
liability under the agreements in this case . . . and it does not
necessarily follow that the plaintiff is liable for the torts of the
dealers merely because it has such a control over the stations as
to subject it to the chain store tax.9"
94. 58 N.J. Super. 584, 597, 157 A.2d 3, 10 (1959) (Conford, J., dissenting), rev'd, 32
N.J. 460, 161 A.2d 247 (1960).
95. This point was the crux of Judge Wright's dissent in Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 543
F.2d 270, 281 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Wright J., dissenting). See text accompanying note 60
supra. See also note 61 supra.
96. Gulf Refining Co. v. Fox, 11 F. Supp. 425, 430-31 (S.D.W. Va. 1935), affd, 297
U.S. 381 (1936). See Comment, 38 MICH. L. REv., supra note 53, at 1067.
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These cases reflect primarily a displeasure with the common
law "control" test when it tends to defeat the statutory purpose,
and most commentators appear to agree with this assessment. 7
Thus, the law in this area has indeed been in retreat from the
rigidity of the common law. It suggests very clearly that the independent contractor immunity should not be raised as a bar to the
fulfillment of specific statutory purposes of overriding social importance. The authors of a leading treatise have observed that:
On the whole the tendency has been to resolve doubts in favor
of the application of such legislation by extending the class of
servant or employee at the expense of the independent contractor in close cases. And while the policies behind these various
statutes and rules may not all be the same, no lawyer will be
surprised to find that these decisions have influenced each other
so as to broaden the class of employees in vicarious liability
cases as well. 8
It is not suggested here that the majority in Amoco Oil
should have affixed the label "employee" on the lessee-retailers
and so have decided the case in traditional terms. Indeed, the
flaw in the court's reasoning lies in the fact that the majority was
transfixed by the common law rules of vicarious liability in tort
and by the need to decide the issue in those traditional terms.
Any attempt to analyze the problem in such a way must end in
a frustration of the desired result. Rather, the better way would
have been to look to the outer limits of the relevant common law
rules, as Judge Wright urged in dissent and as the social
legislation cases indicate can be done. Labels can be traps, and
it has been observed that:
The realistic judge . . . will not fool himself or anyone else
by basing decisions upon circular reasoning from the presence
or absence of corporations, conspiracies, property rights, titles,
contracts, proximate causes, or other legal derivatives of the
judicial decision itself. Rather, he will frankly assess the conflicting human values that are opposed in every controversy,
appraise the social importance of the precedents to which each
claim appeals, [and] open the courtroom to all evidence that
97. Broden, supra note 82; Jacobs, Are "Independent Contractors" Really
Independent?, 3 DEPAUL L. REv. 23, 42 (1953); Stevens, The Test of the Employment
Relation, 38 MICH. L. REv. 188 (1939); Wolfe, Determinationof Employer.Employee Rela.
tionships in Social Legislation, 41 COLUM. L. Rav. 1015 (1941).
98. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 37, at 1404.
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will bring light to this delicate practical task of social adjustment ... .1

To label the lessee-retailer an "independent contractor," the
violation at issue a "tort," and the dispositive test that of common law "control," serves only to mask the delicate practical task
of social adjustment which faced the court in Amoco Oil. The
cases that have been examined clearly indicate that it is possible
to retain the relevant common law rules and at the same time
reshape the tests in order to prevent an undesirable result. Thus,
sound policy reasons require that inquiry be made into the meaning of control or the right to control within a given context. The
question which should have been asked by the Amoco Oil
majority is: Control for what purpose? When so posed, it compels
the result that ought to have been reached. For the purpose of
regulating the sale of unleaded gasoline, the control exercised by
the branded refiners over their lessee-retailers-based upon the
realities of the gasoline distribution system and the nexus between those realities and the statutory purpose-is clearly sufficient to justify the imposition of vicarious liability on the refiners
when contaminated unleaded gasoline is offered for sale at their
lessee-stations. This question should have been resolved in the
context of the Clean Air Act in order to fulfill the statutory purpose, of which the regulations are a necessary and reasonable
part.
Joan A. King
99. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L.
REV. 809, 842 (1935).
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CITY OF EASTLAKE v. FOREST CITY ENTERPRISES,
INC.
ZONING- Constitutional law- City charter provision requiring
that a proposed land use change be approved by popular referendum does not violate the due process rights of a landowner who
applies for a zoning variance. 96 S. Ct. 2358 (1976).
In City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises,Inc., I the Supreme Court held that the due process right of a property owner
to a hearing prior to a decision on his application for a zoning
variance is not denied by a municipal ordinance which provides
for a mandatory community-wide referendum on zoning variance
applications. 2 The decision reflects a shift in the Court's methodology: Zoning cases will no longer be analyzed using the language of equal protection but, rather, will focus on the language
of due process. The result of the Eastlake decision will be to discourage the construction of much needed housing throughout
the country. In addition, the decision erodes the individual's
opportunity to be heard before he is deprived of his property.
The respondent in Eastlake, Forest City Enterprises, was a
real estate developer who acquired an eight-acre parcel of land in
the city of Eastlake, Ohio, an eastern suburb of Cleveland. At the
time of the purchase, the land was zoned for light industrial use
and the developer, wanting to construct an apartment building
on the site, applied to the local planning commission for a zoning
variance to permit such construction. While the application was
pending, the citizens of Eastlake, exercising their rights under the
Ohio Constitution, 3 enacted a provision implementing a mandatory referendum on all proposed land use changes. 4 The applica1. 96 S. Ct. 2358 (1976).
2. Zoning variances are amendments to the municipality's comprehensive zoning

ordinance. The terms "zoning variance," "amendments to the zoning ordinance," "zoning
reclassifications" and "proposed land use changes" have the same meaning and are used
interchangeably.
3. OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1 (1912, amended 1953), provides in part:
The legislative power of the state shall be vested in a general assembly consist-

ing of a senate and house of representatives but the people reserve to themselves
the power to propose to the general assembly laws and amendments to the

constitution, and to adopt or reject the same at the polls on a referendum vote
as hereinafter provided. They also reserve the power to adopt or reject any law,
section of any law or any item in any law appropriating money passed by the

general assembly, except as hereinafter provided; and independent of the general assembly to propose amendments to the constitution and to adopt or reject

the same at the polls.
4. The proposal became part of the Eastlake city charter. EASTLAKE, OHIO, CITY
CHARTER art. VII, § 3 (1971). The provision required that an amendment to the zoning
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tion was subsequently approved by both the local planning com-

mission and the city council, but was defeated at the referendum.
Forest City Enterprises' complaint, alleging that the mandatory

referendum provision was unconstitutional, was rejected by the
state trial and intermediate appellate courts. The trial court did,
however, invalidate the section of the zoning law that required
the applicant-landowner to pay the costs of the referendum, and
the appellate court affirmed.' The Ohio Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the entire mandatory referendum scheme was unconstitutional as applied to applications for amendments to the
comprehensive zoning ordinance.' According to the Ohio Supreme Court, the referendum denied the landowner due process
of law because the electorate is not the proper body to decide the
merits of zoning variance applications.7 The use of the referendum in this context, therefore, constituted an "unlawful delegation of legislative power." 8 The city of Eastlake appealed to the
United States Supreme Court.
The issue presented to the Court was whether Eastlake's city
charter provision, requiring a referendum on all proposed land
use changes without providing standards upon which a decision
could be reached, violated the due process right of a landowner
who applies for a zoning variance. The Court stated that there
was no violation of due process, basing its opinion upon the theory that under our system of government all power derives from
the people, and the people can retain for themselves any power
which they might otherwise delegate to their representatives.'
This power, the majority explained, is embodied in the writings
of the Framers, 0 in the tradition of town meeting government"
and in the Ohio Constitution. 2 Thus the referendum, the Court
ordinance could not become effective until approved by 55% of the votes cast by the voters
of Eastlake. It also provided that the applicant-landowner was to pay the cost of the
election. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2358, 2360 n.1 (1976).
In the United States Supreme Court, Forest City Enterprises did not challenge the 55%
majority requirement as such, nor did it contend that the charter provision did not apply
to its application for a variance since the application had received preliminary approval
before the provision was enacted. Id. at 2361 nn.2 & 4.
5. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 96 S.Ct. 2358, 2361 (1976).
6. Forest City Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Eastlake, 41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 324 N.E.2d
740 (1975), rev'd, 96 S.Ct. 2358 (1976).
7. Id. at 198, 324 N.E.2d at 747.
8. Id.
9. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 96 S.Ct. 2358, 2361 (1976).
10. Id. at 2361 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (J. Madison)).
11. Id. at 2361-62.
12. See note 3 supra.
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noted in quoting an earlier referendum decision, "'is far more
than an expression of ambiguously founded neighborhood preference. It is the city itself legislating through its voters-an exercise by the voters of their traditional right to override the views
of their elected representatives as to what serves the public
interest.' "3 In addition, the Court continued, it insures that all
voters of a municipality will join in a decision which may necessitate a large expenditure of the municipality's funds in order to
finance the increased public services required." The Court concluded that since the landowner could challenge an unreasonable
result of the referendum, the use of the referendum process does
not violate the due process clause when applied to zoning variances."
BACKGROUND-ZONING PROCESS

There are two theories of zoning. Under the first, the property value theory, every piece of property should be used in the
manner which will give it the greatest value without causing a
corresponding decrease in the value of nearby property.'" The
unqualified adherence to this theory, it is contended, results in a
parochialism in land use that cannot be afforded in an age where
solutions to land use problems can only be accomplished by regional cooperation. The second theory, on the other hand, views
zoning as primarily a planning tool used to allocate the scarce
commodity of land for appropriate land uses within an entire
municipality.'" The allocations are codified in the municipality's
comprehensive zoning ordinance, commonly known as the "master plan." The prominent and perhaps most important feature of
the master plan is the provision allowing for zoning variances to
meet unforeseen land use needs in the future." The complexities
of the zoning process require the expertise of several professionals,
including architecture, regional and urban planning, economics
and law. The planning commission or zoning board, the local
body responsible for passing on zoning variance applications, is
13. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2358, 2364 (1976)
(quoting Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. City of Union City, 424
F.2d 291, 294 (9th Cir. 1970)).
14. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 96 S.Ct. 2358, 2364 (1976)
(quoting James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 143 (1971)).
15. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 9.6 S.Ct. 2358, 2364-65 (1976).
16. R. BABCOCK, THE ZONIG GAmE 120 (1966).
17. Id. at 120.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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typically comprised of individuals in these professions or, alternatively, engages these experts as consultants. After consideration of the myriad economic and social factors involved in every
zoning variance request, the commission renders a decision designed to make efficient use of the available land in a manner
consistent with standards enumerated in the comprehensive zoning plan." The issues of a given case are most effectively presented to an adjudicator at a hearing, during which both sides
present their arguments. It is this prior hearing which, traditionally, has been the essence of the zoning variance application process. 2' State zoning statutes generally specify that decisions in
such cases be made by a deliberate governmental body after a
hearing at which all parties articulate their views. 2 The statutes
appear to reflect a belief that the general public does not have the
expertise necessary to pass on zoning variance applicationsexpertise which the organs of government are presumed to exercise. 23 Use of the referendum as a means to decide zoning variance
applications, therefore, could lead to uninformed, subjective results, the effect of which would be the inefficient allocation of
available land, rendering inoperative the master zoning plan and
24
distorting the process of metropolitan growth.
20. Id. See Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 235 N.E.2d 897, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1968);
Kent v. Zoning Bd., 74 R.I. 89, 58 A.2d 623 (1948); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65906 (West 1964).
Cf. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672
(1975). The names and number of the governmental bodies which decide zoning variance
cases vary from one locality to the next. The decision may be made by a planning commission, a zoning board, a general municipal legislature or a combination of these. Under
Eastlake's master plan, the decision was made by the city council after it had considered
the recommendations of the local planning commission.
21. R. BABCOCK, supra note 16, at 134.
22. E.g., N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-738 (McKINNEY 1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.215
(West 1972). Both requirements are combined in one section in each of these statutes. See
also CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65854, 65905 (West 1964) (hearing requirement), § 65901 (West
1964) (commitment of the decision to a governmental body); Onto REV. CODE ANN. §
713.12 (Page 1976) (hearing requirement), § 713.02 (Page 1976) (commitment of the decision to a governmental body).
23. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2358, 2369 (1976)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
24. R. BABCOCK, supra note 16, at 150. See Forman v. Eagle Thrifty Drugs & Mkt.,
Inc., 89 Nev. 533, 516 P.2d 1234 (1973); Township of Sparta v. Spillane, 125 N.J. Super.
519, 525-26, 312 A.2d 154, 157 (1973); Kelley v. John, 162 Neb. 319, 75 N.W.2d 713 (1956).
The comprehensive zoning plan is the basic instrument of land use planning, and ordinances are enacted to administer the plan. Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or.
575, 507 P.2d 23 (1973). The comprehensive plan allocates land uses throughout the
community so as to maximize the use of various areas for housing, agriculture, industry
and recreation, and at the same time preserve property values and protect the physical
environment. R. BABCOCK, supra note 16, at 120.
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THE MAJORITY OPINION

The dearth of discussion in the majority opinion concerning
zoning is indicative of the majority's complete failure to consider
the nature of the zoning process. Instead, the Court focused on
the importance and permissible scope of the referendum. 25 The
stated basis for the majority opinion is the belief that the referendum is a means of popular democracy which serves the purpose
of giving citizens a voice on questions of public policy. 2 All power,
the Court stated, is derived from the people.2 The people can,
therefore, reserve to themselves power to deal directly with mat28
ters which "might otherwise be assigned to the legislature.
Addressing this issue, the Court in Eastlake relied too heavily on
James v. Valtierra,29 which upheld the use of the popular referendum against an equal protection challenge.0 In so doing, the
Court placed undue emphasis on the importance of the referen25. See City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2358, 2363-64 n.11
(1976), where the Court stated that it would consider only the due process and not the
zoning issue.
26. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2358, 2364 (1976) (citing James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971)). See text accompanying note 14 supra.
The rationale behind the use of referenda is a distrust of legislatures. Referenda provide
the voting public with the opportunity both to initiate laws the legislature failed to enact
and to repeal unpopular laws. West v. City of Portage, 392 Mich. 458, 221 N.W.2d 303
(1974). In Valtierra the Court upheld the use of a mandatory referendum to prevent the
local arm of the California state housing authority from applying for federal funds to subsidize the construction of low-income housing in the municipality without prior voter approval. The respondents, persons who qualified for admission into low-income housing
projects, claimed that they were denied equal protection. Most referenda, they alleged,
are optional, but the referendum on seeking funds for low-income housing is mandatory.
As a result, persons seeking public housing are prevented from achieving their objective
while groups seeking to influence other public decisions to their advantage do not face
this problem. The Court rejected the equal protection claim, stating that all laws disadvantage one or several groups. Noting the long history of the use of referenda in California, the Court concluded that the respondents were not singled out for being subjected to
the mandatory referendum. If the equal protection argument -wereto prevail, the majority
added, the Court would be required to examine all government procedures and decide the
validity of each on the basis of whether it disadvantages one group or another. This, the
Valtierra Court concluded, is pushing the protection afforded by the equal protection
clause beyond its limit.
27. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2358, 2361 (1976) (citing
THE FEDERALsT No. 39 (J. Madison)). In Ohio, for example, the state constitution reflects
the people's desire to reserve the powers of initiative and referendum for themselves. OHIO
CONST. art. II, § 1 (1912).
28. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2358, 2361 (1976) (citing
Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392 (1969)).
29. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
30. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2358, 2364 (1976).
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dum,3 ' thereby completely ignoring the need for standards to
guide decisionmaking in the area of zoning, even if a referendum
is used. 3 The unqualified statement that the people can take into
their own hands the fate of every piece of proposed legislation by
means of the referendum perpetuates the "fallacious assumption" that the mere will of the electorate should prevail. 33 This is
34
not the nature of our democracy.
While it may be true that all power derives from the people,33
one should also be aware that there exists a great danger to individual rights in the unrestrained exercise of power by the people:3"
Wherever the real power in a Government lies, there is the danger of oppression. In our Governments the real power lies in the
majority of the Community, and the invasion of private rights
is chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts of Government contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the
Government is the mere instrumentality of the major number
of the Constituents. This is a truth of great importance, but not
yet sufficiently attended to . . ..
Our government is not a popular democracy but a representative one. 3 The purpose of this representation is to insure that
proposed measures will either pass or fail only after deliberate
31. Id. at 2366, 2371 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For criticism of the reliance on the
referendum in Valtierra, see Lefcoe, The PublicHousing Referendum Case, Zoning & The
Supreme Court, 59 CALF. L. REv. 1384 (1971).

32. See City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2358, 2363-64 n.11
(1976).
33. Otey v. Common Council of the City of Milwaukee, 281 F. Supp. 264, 275 (E.D.
Wis. 1968). "'It seems fatally easy to believe that loyalty to democratic principles entails
acceptance of what may be termed moral populism: the view that the majority have a
moral right to dictate how all should live. This is a misunderstanding of democracy which
still menaces individual liberty . . . .'" Id. at 275 (quoting H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY,
& MoRALrrY 79 (1966)). See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 387 (1967) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).

34. Ex parte Wall, 48 Cal. 279 (1878). See also City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2358, 2370 n.12 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
35. U.S. CONST. Preamble. See also City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc.,

96 S.Ct. 2358, 2361 (1976).
36. 5 WRrnNoS OF JAMES MADISON 272 (Hunt ed. 1904), quoted in Reitman v. Mulkey,

387 U.S. 369, 387 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring).
37. Id.
38. Ex parte Wall, 48 Cal. 279, 314 (1878). In a popular democracy, the entire community legislates by means of a plebiscite. In a representative democracy, on the other
hand, the citizens elect representatives to legislate for them. Although elements of popular
democracy exist in our system of government, e.g., the referendum, our democracy is
overwhelmingly representative in nature. Evidence for this is the existence of countless
legislative and administrative bodies from the municipal to the federal levels of government.
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and enlightened discussion. Therefore, if issues of public concern
are submitted to the people, they must be accompanied by standards to guide and enlighten the decisionmaking process in order
to insure a rational result.39 Indeed, even those persons present at
the traditional town meeting, which the Eastlake majority extolled as the precursor of the referendum, were guided by very
precise standards in rendering a decision."0 In the town meeting,
a moderator presided over the gathering, informing the townspeople what factors they were to consider in making their determination. Most importantly, the people were not permitted to decide
a case until both sides had presented their arguments. 41 Thus, the
town meeting more accurately parallels the conventional system
of deciding zoning variance cases than the referendum process.
That is, the determination of the issue is made by a deliberative
governmental body after the parties have had an opportunity to
be heard. It is naive to think that all the pertinent issues will be
exposed by the parties during the campaign preceding the referendum. The issues will not be properly aired by either side in
their attempt to persuade the electorate, nor will the contemplative deliberation necessary to make a proper determination be
made .42

The Supreme Court has previously noted the lesson learned
from town meeting government. In Eubank v. Richmond43 and in
Washington ex rel. Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberge, 4 the Court decided that the authority granted to local residents to approve or
defeat proposed land use changes had to be governed by articulated standards in order to prevent a decision based upon the
arbitrary and capricious whims of the public.
The Eastlake majority attempted to distinguish these cases
39. Id. Accord, Washington ex ret. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116,
122 (1928); Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 144 (1912). See notes 43 & 44 infra.
40. Ex parte Wall, 48 Cal. 279, 314 (1878).

41. Id.
42. Township of Sparta v. Spillane, 125 N.J. Super. 519, 312 A.2d 154 (1973).

43. 226 U.S. 137 (1912). In Eubank the Court struck down an ordinance which allowed two-thirds of the property owners on any street to determine the building line for
that street. The property owners had virtual control over the property rights of other
nonvoting property owners, and in the absence of standards to guide their action, they
could act solely for their own benefit. The Court concluded that this was capricious and

therefore held that the standardless delegation of authority from the legislature to the
local property owners was invalid.

44. 278 U.S. 116 (1928). In Roberge the Court struck down a statute which gave
property owners the power to defeat certain land use reclassifications. The Court reached

this result for the same reasons enunciated in Eubank.
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on the ground that they involved the delegation of authority to a
narrow segment of the community. On the other hand, the Court
reasoned, the referendum mandates that the entire community
decide the fate of a proposed change in the existing land use
scheme. 5 The majority assumed, evidently without factual
support, that the proposed apartment building would require increased public services, the costs of which would be borne by each
taxpayer in Eastlake." In addition, the Court noted, the city's tax
base would decline since an industrial complex, the use for which
the parcel was originally zoned, would now be excluded from the
site.4" Inasmuch as the entire city of Eastlake would be affected
by the change in these "environmental factors" caused by the
zoning variance and the consequent construction of the apartment complex, the Court held that all the residents of Eastlake
had the right to vote on it.
The Court, however, based its decision on the undocumented
assumption that the construction of an apartment complex would
affect the entire city. 8 While it is commonly accepted that the use
to which one piece of property is put has an effect upon adjacent
and nearby property, 9 it does not necessarily follow that there
will be a city-wide effect. The tendency to limit the number of
neighbors who receive notice of a landowner's application for a
zoning variance reflects the predominating view that zoning
changes affect only a very small area. 5' Justice Stevens noted in
his dissenting opinion that there was no factual basis or indica45. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2358, 2364 (1976).
46. Id. at 2362 n.7.
47. Id. The Court relied upon James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), for this proposition.
48. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2358, 2368 n.10 (1976)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
49. Johnston v. City of Claremont, 49 Cal. 2d 826, 323 P.2d 71, 78 (1958). See text
accompanying note 16 supra.
50. Compare James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), with Thomas Cusak Co. v.
City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917), and National Lane & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504,
524-31, 215 A.2d 597, 608-12 (1965). In Valtierra the Court assumed that an apartment
complex would affect the entire community. Little evidence was provided by the Court
for this proposition. In the NationalLand case, the Pennsylvania court thoroughly examined the alleged community-wide effects of a zoning variance and concluded that the
effect of the variance would be very small.
51. R. BABCOCK, supra note 16, at 140. See Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago,
242 U.S. 256 (1917). The statute in Cusack required approval or disapproval of proposed
land use changes by those property owners most directly affected by the proposed change.
See also Cook-Johnson Realty Co. v. Bertolini, 15 Ohio St. 2d 195, 201, 239 N.E.2d 80, 84
(1968) (dictum). The Bertolini court strongly supported the proposition expressed by the
statute involved in Cusack.
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tion in the record that the developer's proposed apartment complex would have any effect on the community as a whole.5 2 Thus,
the lack of evidence that the land use change would entail increased costs for the community, coupled with the view that zoning changes generally affect only a very small area, militate
against the use of the referendum which allows the entire community to express its view.5
There is one further weakness in the environmental factors
approach. Both state and federal courts have recognized that this
argument is usually used as a ploy to exclude undesired land uses
from a community, even where the undesired land use is consistent with the master zoning plan. 4 Such an attempt to prevent
an increase in population and exclude undesired economic burdens has been held to be unconstitutional.5 One Supreme Court
case that offers valuable insight into this area is Shapiro v.
Thompson." In Shapiro the Court held that the requirement that
an indigent person reside in a state for one year in order to be
eligible for public assistance violated the equal protection clause
of the Constitution. Although Shapiro did not involve real estate,
a clear implication of the case is that all state legislative attempts
to exclude future economic burdens are invalid.5 7 By supporting
the environmental factors argument, then, the Eastlake majority
has moved away from the trend of cases which reject this approach and has reinforced an argument that will be used to
justify opposition to all future residential construction.
In addition to the policy-oriented environmental factors argument, the Court in Eastlake relied on a doctrinal distinction
between legislative and administrative acts to support its view
that applications for zoning variances are subject to the referen52. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2358, 2368 (1976)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
53. See notes 50-52 supra.
54. National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 530-31, 215 A.2d 597, 611 (1965).
55. The scope of this Note does not include a discussion of exclusionary zoning. In

summary, those statutes whose purposes or effects are to exclude population growth and
to avoid future economic burdens (such as increased costs for public services which will
be reflected in higher taxes) have been declared unconstitutional. See Southern Burling-

ton County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied,
423 U.S. 808 (1975); Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970);
National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965). But see Village of

Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Co., 45 U.S.L.W. 4073 (1977). On the
issue of "zoning out" future economic burdens, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969).
56. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
57. Id. at 629-32.
58. See note 55 supra.
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dum process.59 The master zoning plan can be said to be a legislative act since it establishes a community-wide policy without
regard to individual cases. 60 Administrative acts, on the other
hand, implement the legislative plan and apply the general rule
of conduct to specific cases. 6 ' It is generally thought that legislative acts and not administrative acts6 2 are subject to review by
referenda. The master zoning plan establishes a general rule of
conduct and is, therefore, clearly a legislative act." The Eastlake
majority, citing a long list of decisions (including that of the Ohio
Supreme Court in Eastlake4 ) which labeled the grant of zoning
variances "legislative acts," concluded from this, without further
reasoning, that zoning variances are also legislative acts and are
therefore subject to the referendum.15 The Court's conclusion
apparently ignores the clear distinction between the adoption of
a comprehensive city-wide plan (legislative action) and the determination of particular issues involving specific uses of individual
parcels of land (administrative acts).66 Despite the fact that public policy questions are involved in the determination, decisions
on zoning variance applications are basically adjudicatory and
require a prior hearing because of the need for dispassionate expertise, and because they have a far greater impact on one citizen
or group of citizens than on the public generally. 7
59. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2358, 2362 (1976).
60. Kelley v. John, 162 Neb. 319, 75 N.W.2d 713, 715-16 (1956).
61. Kropf v. City of Sterling Heights, 391 Mich. 139, 215 N.W.2d 179 (1974).
62. West v. City of Portage, 392 Mich. 458, 221 N.W.2d 303 (1974); Kropf v. City of
Sterling Heights, 391 Mich. 139, 215 N.W.2d 179 (1974).
63. See City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2358, 2370 (1976)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). See also West v. City of Portage, 392 Mich. 458, 221 N.W.2d 303
(1974); Kropf v. City of Sterling Heights, 391 Mich. 139, 215 N.W.2d 179 (1974).
64. Forest City Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Eastlake, 41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 189, 324
N.E.2d 740, 743 (1975), rev'd, 96 S. Ct. 2358 (1976).
65. Compare In re Frank, 183 Neb. 722, 723, 164 N.W.2d 215, 216 (1969), and Hilltop
Realty Inc. v. South Euclid, 110 Ohio App. 535, 164 N.E.2d 180, 181-82 (1960), and
Johnston v. City of Claremont, 49 Cal. 2d 826, 835, 323 P.2d 71, 76 (1958), which held
that zoning variances are legislative acts, with West v. City of Portage, 392 Mich. 458,
472, 221 N.W.2d 303, 310 (1974), and Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574,
580, 586, 507 P.2d 23, 26, 29 (1973), and Kelley v. John, 162 Neb. 319, 75 N.W.2d 713,
715 (1956), which held that zoning variances are administrative acts.
66. See City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2358, 2370 (1976)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Kropf v. City of Sterling Heights, 391 Mich. 139, 215 N.W.2d
179 (1974).
67. See City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2358, 2371 (1976)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 299, 502 P.2d 327,
331 (1972); Hurst v. City of Burlingame, 207 Cal. 134, 277 P. 308, 311 (1929); Ulman v.
Mayor of Baltimore, 72 Md. 587, 592-95, 20 A. 141, 142-43 (1890). Compare Bi-Metallic
Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915), with Londoner v. Denver, 210
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A further flaw in the reasoning of the majority is found in its
analysis of the nature of the due process right. It is clear that the
constitutional right to use one's property to one's own economic
advantage, within the restriction of zoning laws, is protected
against interference by the state without due process of law.6" The
essence of due process is that an individual be granted a hearing
before he is deprived of any significant property interest." One
element of due process, perhaps its most basic component, is the
notion of fairness. 70 It is simply not fair, Justice Stevens argued
in his dissenting opinion, to deprive a landowner of his right to
use his real property to his best advantage unless and until a
hearing is held to decide the merits of the case in accordance with
particular standards. 7' In order to assure fairness within the
meaning of the due process clause, the determination, which is
consistent with the spirit of the master zoning plan 72 and takes
into consideration all relevant social and economic factors, must
U.S. 373 (1908). In Bi-Metallic the Court held that the appellant did not have a right to
a hearing to challenge an increase in the assessed valuation of all taxable property in
Denver before it took effect. The action of the Board carried no administrative or legislative label, although the Board was an administrative agency. It was simply described as
being of general, community-wide application. In Londoner the Court held, again without
attaching labels, that where a decision was applicable only to the residents of one block,
those residents had a right to a hearing before the decision was put into effect. The
residents who would be affected by the decision could inform the Board of individual
hardships which it may have overlooked in making its decision. In Bi-Metallic, however,
the Board had carefully evaluated the general impact of the increased assessment, and
there was no evidence the complaining individuals could add to that which the Board had
already examined.
68. U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 1. See City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises,
Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2358, 2365 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting); National Land & Inv. Co. v.
Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 522, 215 A.2d 597, 607 (1965); Hurst v. City of Burlingame, 207 Cal.
134, 277 P. 308 (1929); People's Lobby, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 30 Cal. App. 3d 869,
106 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1973).
69. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Scott v. City of Indian Wells, 6 Cal.
3d 541, 492 P.2d 1137, 99 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1972). Boddie did not concern real property but
rather the challenge by indigent welfare recipients to a state law which required the
payment of court costs in order to obtain a divorce. The Court, however, stated as a general principle that "the right to a meaningful opportunity to be heard within the limits of
practicality must be protected" if the mandate of the due process clause is to be satisfied.
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379-80 (1971). The fact that the particular form of
the hearing required by due process varies "does not affect its root requirement that an
individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant
property interest . .

. ."

Id. at 379.

70. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
71. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2358, 2371 (1976)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). The authority for this proposition is derived from the nature of
zoning and the requirements of due process.
72. See text accompanying notes 16-21 supra. See also note 67 supra.
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be made before the landowner is deprived of his property. The
majority in Eastlake stated that the landowner was not deprived
of any due process right as long as he had an opportunity to
challenge the result of the referendum in state court.73 If this is
to be the remedy, the landowner will have no alternative but to
await the outcome in order to challenge the result. This falls
within the category of unfair practices described by Justice Stevens74 and by existing laws.15 It is insufficient because it denies

the landowner due process of law and, furthermore, ignores the
practical necessities of zoning.
THE MAJORITY OPINION-A METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

It is puzzling that the Court completely ignored the nature
of the zoning process, choosing instead to adopt the environmental factors argument unquestioningly. 7 Yet upon examination of
the Court's underlying methodology, the decision becomes somewhat more understandable. Prior to Eastlake, challenges to zoning statutes-comprehensive master plans and zoning variance
77
ordinances-were based heavily on equal protection claims. It
was suggested after James v. Valtierra, on which the Eastlake
majority relied, that the Court sought to move away from analyz78
ing zoning referenda according to equal protection principles.
All government procedures affect one group more than others,
and if the Court were to declare a mandatory referendum provision violative of the equal protection clause, it would have to
embark on an endless inquiry of every government action to determine whether a clearly identifiable group had been singled out
for special treatment. 7 The Court preferred to analyze zoning
referenda cases using the language of due process and by weighing
the harms caused to the litigants which resulted from the pres73. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2358, 2363, 2364 & n.13
(1976).
74. Id. at 2372 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75. See note 22 supra.
76. See note 46 supra.The majority noted that only the specific due process questions
addressed by the Ohio Supreme Court would be considered. City of Eastlake v. Forest City
Enterprises, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2358, 2363 n.11 (1976). The Ohio Supreme Court majority
opinion did not discuss the practicalities of zoning, although the concurring opinion did.
77. E.g., James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. City of Union City, 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970).
78. Lefcoe, The Public Housing Referendum Case, Zoning, & the Supreme Court, 59
CALIF. L. REv. 1384, 1390, 1411, 1428, 1457 (1971).
79. Id. at 1390.
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ence or absence of the government regulation."0 The Eastlake
decision confirms that this is the path the Court is taking.81 The
Court examines and compares the harm inflicted upon the landowners by the referendum, and the harm to collective public participation in government that would result if there were no mandatory referendum provision. In Eastlake the Court notes that
since the landowner bought the parcel with existing restrictions
on its use and since he can challenge the result of the referendum
in a judicial forum, the harm caused to his interests by the referendum is minimal.8 2 On the other hand, in the majority's view,
the grave harm caused by eliminating the use of the referendum
is the decline of the long-cherished value of popular democracy.,
When the case is viewed in these terms, the decision becomes
comprehensible, though no more acceptable.
Unfortunately, the Court did not weigh all the facts in reaching its decision. Both the realities and purposes of zoning and the
collateral due process problem were completely ignored by the
Court. Furthermore, in adopting selective facts and in embracing,
for example, the environmental factors approach, the Court has
dignified an argument which will be used in the future to oppose
the construction of housing. 4 Since 1949, Congress has repeatedly
emphasized its intent to achieve "as soon as feasible. . . the goal
of a decent home and a suitable living environment for every
American family . . . .,, The Eastlake decision serves only to
frustrate this policy.
Steven C. Spronz
80. Id. at 1457-58.
81. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2358, 2364-65 & n.13
(1976).
82. Id. at 2365 n.15.
83. See notes 9-13 supra and accompanying text.
84. In Eastlake the electorate attempted and succeeded in preventing the construction of an apartment complex in a community of predominantly single-family homes.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1970).
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